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In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,1 the United
States Supreme Court indicated that the defendant bears the burden of pro-
duction in a Title VII disparate treatment case. Although an employer need
not prove that legal reasons motivated its decision, it must do more than
merely plead the existence of a legitimate reason. The Burdine Court left un-
resolved whether the defendant's burden requires introducing evidence of the
existence of the reason, or proving the existence of the reason. Proper analysis
suggests that the defendant's burden is to establish that the reason asserted
actually exists. It is only by convincing the trier of fact that the reason exists
that the defendant meets its burden of going forward on the ultimate issue of
motivation. This intermediate burden is consistent with the established princi-
ple that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
motivation.
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B., 1963, Drury College; J.D., 1965, Univer-
sity of Missouri-Columbia; LL.M., 1972, George Washington University.
1. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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I. DISPARATE TREATMENT AND THE McDonnell Douglas MODEL
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 prohibits employers, labor or-
ganizations, and employment agencies from discriminating "because" of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of the employee or applicant. The
term "because" suggests that the defendant's motivation is a substantive ele-
ment of the statutory scheme. Indeed, in disparate treatment cases-those in-
volving a single decision to discharge, promote, or hire a particular per-
son-illegal motivation is the key issue.3 Motive, a state of mind, is a
subjective fact, and in many cases there is no direct evidence of the fact. Proof
of motivation can be drawn, however, from inferences that flow from objective
facts. Direct evidence of improper motive is not required."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5 is the seminal case setting forth the
model by which the inferences of motivation are created. McDonnell Douglas
places the initial burden upon the plaintiff to establish six elements: (1) plain-
tiff belongs to a class protected by Title VII (racial, ethnic minority, or a
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The provision relevant to
this discussion is found in § 703(a) of the Act:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976); see also id. §§ 2000e-2(b) to (d) (similar language applicable to
labor organizations and employment agencies).
Title VII racial discrimination claims may arise in two ways. "An individual may allege that
he has been subjected to 'disparate treatment' . . . or that he has been a victim of a facially
neutral practice having a 'disparate impact on his racial group.'" Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). If an employer utilizes a selection device
that has a adverse impact on a protected class and the employer cannot justify that the device has
a manifest relationship to job performance, the fact that the employer has no invidious motivation
is not determinative. "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices. . . . [G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 432 (1971). When the issue is disparate treatment of a particular
employee or a particular employment decision, however, the motivation for that decision is the key
element. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576, 580 (1978); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); see generally B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1153-58 (1976). This Article addresses disparate
treatment cases.
3. While not obligated to prove that the improper grounds were the sole cause, the plain-
tiff must show that the employment action would not have been taken but for the race, sex, reli-
gion, or national origin of the plaintiff. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
282 n.10 (1976); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 2253-54.
4. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1982).
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
HeinOnline  -- 49 Mo. L. Rev. 18 1984
1984] TITLE VII BURDENS 19
woman);6 (2) defendant had a vacancy and was seeking applicants; (3) plain-
tiff had the qualifications for the position; (4) plaintiff applied; (5) plaintiff
was not hired; and (6) the position remained open or was filled by a non-
minority person.7 From this showing flows "an inference of discrimination...
6. White males are protected by Title VII against race discrimination. McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). It is doubtful whether a white male could
establish a prima facie case of illegally motivated race or sex discrimination using the McDonnell
Douglas model in the context of an employer dominated by white males. If the employer is minor-
ity dominated, a white applicant would be able to invoke the McDonnell Douglas approach. See
Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1982).
7. 411 U.S. at 802. The Court actually listed only four elements:
(i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualification, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. Under element (ii), the Court combined three distinct factors: application, plaintiff's qualifica-
tion, and vacancy. Each element must be separately established. See, e.g., Johnson v. Armco, Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D. Md. 1982) (failure to prove application); Lee v. National Can Co.,
699 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1983) (failure to prove qualification); Wright v. Stone Container
Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Daves v. Payless Cashways, 661 F.2d 1022,
1025 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (failure to prove vacancy).
The weight of authority indicates that the plaintiff need only show that she possesses the
posted job qualifications, or otherwise has been satisfactorily performing the job. See Eastland v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 625 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698
F.2d 633, 671 (4th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir.
1983); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981). International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) suggested that the plaintiff must establish "an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications" for the person hired. Id. at 358 n.44 (dictum). Some
courts have followed this statement and required plaintiffs to prove relatively superior qualifica-
tions. E.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1983); Cuthbertson v.
Bigger Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 1983); Cartogena v. Secretary of Navy, 618 F.2d
130, 133 (Ist Cir. 1980); see also Mason v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 366 (7th
Cir. 1983) (dicta) (proof of minimal qualifications required for routine jobs, while non-routine
jobs require proof of plaintiff's relative superiority). But see Aikens v. United States Postal Serv.,
665 F.2d 1057, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff does not need to prove her superior qualifica-
tions), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983); cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (hiring a person of comparative superior ability may be a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason).
Similar standards have been applied when the plaintiff is refused a promotion, United States
Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (1983); Brown v. Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600, 603 (6th
Cir. 1982), or denied a transfer. Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1975).
The McDonnell Douglas formula, with appropriate modifications, has been adapted to discrimina-
tory discharge cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
(1981). The plaintiff's prima facie discharge case consists of showing that she was a member of a
class traditionally subject to discrimination, performing satisfactory work for defendant, dis-
charged, and that the employer sought to fill the vacancy or utilized non-minority persons to
perform the work. EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v.
Bunny Bread Co., 647 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552
F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977). But see Morvay v. Maghielse Tool & Die Co., 708 F.2d 229,
233 (6th Cir. 1983) (prima facie case requires proof that plaintiff was discharged without good
cause). Morvay improperly forces the plaintiff to prove a negative, and seems contrary to Burdine.
If the defendant can demonstrate that the vacancy was filled by a person of the same race or
gender as the plaintiff, the prima facie case may be rebutted. Freeman v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 398,
402 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Jones v. Western Geographical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir.
1982); DeVolld v. Bailar, 568 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978); Brazer v. St. Regis Paper Co., 498
F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (M.D. Fla. 1980); cf. Keys v. Lutheran Family & Children's Servs., 668
F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1981) (allegation that plaintiff was replaced by another minority applicant not
sufficient to support summary judgment).
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because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 8
After the plaintiff has established an inference of illegal motivation
through this prima facie case, McDonnell Douglas states that "the burden
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."" Denial of illegal motivation will not suf-
fice; a "reason" must be "articulated." Failure of the defendant to "articu-
late" a "reason" that is "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory" will result in a
judgment, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff. 0 When "all legitimate reasons
for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated [or none are articulated]...
it is more likely than not the employer, whom we generally assume acts only
with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consid-
eration."""
If the defendant carries its burden of articulating a legitimate nondis-
The McDonnell Douglas prima facie case formulation is not always required. If the plaintiff
has direct or circumstantial evidence of improper motivation and the defendant has articulated
reasons for its action, the trial court may go directly to the issue of improper motivation without
any particular attention to the precise requirements of the McDonnell Douglas elements. United
States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 U.S. 1478, 1482 (1983); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ.,
684 F.2d 769, 774 (11 th Cir. 1982). A prima facie showing of improperly motivated discrimina-
tion may be made by statistics that indicate a particular employment decision could not have been
based on prescribed factors. Gay v. Waiters Local Union, No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 552 (9th Cir.
1982); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Califano, 613
F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This showing, similar to direct evidence of improper motivation,
will shift the burden to the defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
action. Id.
8. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
9. 411 U.S. at 802.
10. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Paxton v.
Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1772 (1983).
Prior to Burdine, there was some question whether the prima facie case merely allowed a finding
on behalf of the plaintiff, or, in the absence of contradicting evidence, required a finding for the
plaintiff. See Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1149-50 (1980); see also Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474, 478
(10th Cir. 1976) (unrefuted prima facie case does not require judgment for plaintiff). Burdine
clearly held, however, that the inference of discrimination created by a prima facie case is not
merely "permissible"; it is more in the nature of a "presumption" that requires a judgment in
favor of the party who has the benefit of the presumed fact. Cf. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2494 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1981).
A reason will be "legitimate and nondiscriminatory" even if it is not sufficiently strong as to
be considered "necessary." Furno Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). It need not
even be directly related to actual or projected job performance. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). It would seem that to be "legitimate," however, a reason could
not otherwise violate the law. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
362 (1978) (defendant's burden in a "pattern or practice suit" is to set forth "lawful reasons"). A
totally arbitrary reason would not be "legitimate." See Brown v. Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600, 605
(6th Cir. 1982); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1345-46 (5th Cir. 1980), modi-
fied, 644 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1982); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158, 1159 (8th Cir.
1977). A reason totally divorced from reasonable employer concerns could not carry a factual
inference that it was the articulated reason rather than illegal concerns that motivated the em-
ployer's decision.
II. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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criminatory reason, it will be entitled to judgment unless the plaintiff presents
additional evidence, direct or circumstantial, of illegal motivation.1" The bur-
den thus shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence, beyond the prima
facie case, that tends to establish the defendant's improper motivation. Mc-
Donnell Douglas indicated that evidence of pretext might consist of proof that
the "reason" was not uniformly applied, that the defendant has expressed spe-
cific prejudice against the plaintiff's class, or that the defendant's general em-
ployment practices show a discriminatory pattern, which suggests a subtle dis-
criminatory bias.'3
McDonnell Douglas did not indicate whether a plaintiff who had
12. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), held that once the
defendant has met its burden, the plaintiff has to make some presentation of evidence or elicit
from the defendant on cross examination some evidence that tends to establish improper motiva-
tion. Id. at 255. Failure of the plaintiff to provide some additional evidence would result in judg-
ment for the defendant. See, e.g., Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). The
Court thus utilized a modified version of Professor Thayer's bursting bubble theory of presump-
tions, adopted by Federal Rule of Evidence 301. Once the presumption is met by contradictory
evidence, it ceases to have any probative value. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVI-
DENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 346 (1898). The Court rejected the theory that a presumption
flowing from a prima facie case shifted to the defendant a risk of non-persuasion on the fact
presumed (motivation). See E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 80-81 (1956). But the Court did not hold that the presumption en-
tirely "disappeared," as Thayer suggested. Rather, the Court stated that in evaluating whether
plaintiff had persuaded the fact finder of the employer's motivation, the fact finder should "con-
sider evidence previously introduced by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case." 450 U.S. at 255
n.10. But cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983) (trial court could
resolve the ultimate issue of motive without deciding whether a prima facie case had been estab-
lished). For a thorough discussion of Title VII presumptions in a pre-Burdine context, see Men-
dez, supra note 10, at 1141-61. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2493.
13. 411 U.S. at 804-05. "[S]tatistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may
be helpful in determinating of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent in this case con-
formed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks." Id. at 805; see Davis v. Califano,
613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (relied almost exclusively on statistics to establish improper
motivation); see also Gay v. Waiters Local Union No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 1982);
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 820 (5th Cir. 1982). For an example of the lack of
uniformity in imposing the rules, see Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir.
1982) (en banc); Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 566 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1978). Pretext may
be established from a broad pattern of treatment, Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp.
202, 215 (W.D. Mo. 1972), a.fid, 472 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1973), or through direct statements of
prejudice, Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 626 (5th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff's
relatively superior credentials plus extremely subjective articulated reasons also might show pre-
text. See Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1983); Paxton v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 569 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717
F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983); Verniero v. Air Force School Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 392
(10th Cir. 1983). A formalistic "three step minuet" is possible, with the plaintiff making a prima
facie case, followed by the defendant's presentation challenging either the prima facie case or
"articulating legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons," followed by the plaintiff making a rebuttal
demonstration of pretext. The trial court, however, controls the order of proof. FED. R. EvID. 611.
Thus, a court, in its discretion, may require the plaintiff to present all of its evidence at one time,
reserving for rebuttal only direct refutation of the defendant's evidence. Holden v. Commission
Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1982); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552
F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977); Sime v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th
Cir. 1975). Even when a two-step procedure is followed, it is desirable to analyze the evidentiary
obligations as having three basic stages: plaintiff's prima facie presentation, defendant's challenge,
and plaintiff's additional evidence of actual motivation.
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presented additional evidence of illegal motivation had the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of motivation, or whether after the plaintiff's burden of
presenting additional evidence of motivation was satisfied, it was the defendant
who must carry a burden of persuasion by convincing the trier of fact that the
plaintiff's rejection was motivated by the articulated reason. The issue was
eventually resolved; the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the existence of illegal motivation. 14 The precise nature of the defendant's evi-
dentiary burden, however, short of a burden of persuasion on motivation, has
not been determined.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE EVIDENTIARY ISSUE
A. The Two Levels of Factual Inquiry in Disparate Treatment
Cases: Intermediate and Ultimate Issues
The ultimate factual issue in disparate treatment cases is the defendant's
motivation. Intermediate factual issues may arise, and they may create infer-
ences that go to the ultimate issue. McDonnell Douglas teaches that plaintiffs
create a "rebuttable presumption" of illegal motivation by proving the exis-
tence of the six elements previously enumerated. 15 In presenting the prima
facie case, however, the factual existence of one or more of these elements
may become an issue. For example, the plaintiff may assert that she was quali-
fied, and present evidence that she possessed the posted job credentials. Defen-
dant may assert, with supporting evidence, that the plaintiff lacked the an-
nounced minimal qualifications. Whether plaintiff was "qualified" thus
becomes a factual issue. Only if this issue is resolved in favor of the plaintiff
can the court rule that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Simi-
larly, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had a vacancy at the time of
14. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Sweeney v.
Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (per curiam). The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and
Title VII share common language and history. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1957 (1983).
Consequently, lower federal courts interpreting the Age Act have adopted the McDonnell Douglas
formula for establishing improper motivation. Plaintiff must establish that she is: (1) in the pro-
tected age group of 40-70; (2) has met applicable job qualifications; (3) applied for a vacancy; (4)
was not hired; and (5) that the employer continued to seek applications from persons with similar
qualifications. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); Lovelace v.
Sherman-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 238 (1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32
(9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011 (1st Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. .1978). These circuits do not require as part
of a prima facie case that plaintiffs prove that someone outside the protected age group was fa-
vored. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, however, require such additional proof. See Williams v.
General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, 675
F.2d 1221, 1224 (1 1th Cir. 1982). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment. If the de-
fendant succeeds in articulating such a reason, the issue becomes one of fact, with the burden on
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that age was the motivating reason. In Age
Act cases, unlike Title VII suits, a jury trial is provided. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1976). Thus, the
steps must be set forth to the jury in instructions, and the jury makes ultimate factual resolutions.
15. United States Postal Ser,. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481 (1983).
[Vol. 49
HeinOnline  -- 49 Mo. L. Rev. 22 1984
TITLE VII BURDENS
the application. If this fact is denied by the defendant, the plaintiff must carry
the burden of convincing the fact finder that a vacancy in fact existed. If the
plaintiff succeeds in establishing her qualifications for the vacancy, the court
must infer that improper considerations motivated the employer's action. If
the plaintiff fails to convince the court that she is qualified or that a vacancy
exists, however, there can be no inference of illegal motivation, and plaintiff's
suit must be dismissed. 6
When the plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie case, the de-
fendant's attempt to satisfy its "burden" to articulate a legitimate reason
might create a factual issue of the existence of the "reason." Resolution of this
intermediate factual issue is no less significant than the resolution of the fac-
tual issues going to the elements of a prima facie case. The existence of the
"'reason" is necessary to create an inference going to the defendant's
motivation.
Assume that the defendant confronts a prima facie case by pleading that
the plaintiff was discharged, not because of her sex, but because she was
drinking alcoholic beverages on the job (clearly a "legitimate" reason, if
proved). Plaintiff denies the charge. A factual issue now is joined as to
whether the plaintiff was drinking on the job. Resolution of this intermediate
factual issue is significant. If the plaintiff was drinking on the job or the defen-
dant reasonably believed that she was, 17 it is proper for a court to infer that
the perceived misconduct motivated the employer action-the plaintiff was
discharged "because" she was drinking. If the plaintiff is not found to have
been drinking, then a court would be unable to infer that the apparent viola-
tion of a work rule motivated the employer's decision. Resolving the intermedi-
ate factual issue is necessary because the intermediate facts are the foundation
upon which the inferences going to the ultimate issue of motivation are based.
B. Two Concepts of "Burden". Production and Persuasion
"Burden" has two meanings in the law of evidence. One burden is that of
producing evidence of a particular fact,18 sometimes called the burden of going
16. The plaintiff thus carries the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persua-
sion (risk of nonpersuasion) on the factual existence of the elements necessary for a prima facie
case. If the plaintiff fails to carry this burden of persuasion, the defendant prevails as a matter of
law. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 430 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Lee v. National
Can Corp., 699 F.2d 932, 936 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 148 (1983); Jackson v. United
States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 442 (3d Cir. 1980); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 730 (7th
Cir. 1979); Simes v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 526 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir. 1975); Peters v.
Jefferson Chem. Corp., 516 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. If the defendant in fact believed that the plaintiff was guilty of a rule infraction and
acted on that belief, the "fact" of such a belief would suffice as a legitimate "reason." De Anda v.
St. Joseph's Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1982); Turner v. Texas Instruments, 555 F.2d
1252, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1977).
18. C. MCCORMICK, MCCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 783 (2d ed. J.
Cleary 1972); J. TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 22 (1961); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 10, § 2487.
1984]
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forward with the evidence. If the party who has the burden of production fails
to present evidence that would permit a finding on that factual issue, the party
with that burden will lose. The burden of production is met, not by convincing
the fact finder of the truth of the fact, but by satisfying the court that such a
finding could be made. "The second. . .[meaning of burden] is the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true."1 This burden is
called the burden of persuasion or the risk of nonpersuasion. These distinctions
are particularly significant in jury trials because the burden of production is
an issue of law to be decided by the court; the judge determines whether the
party on whom the burden rests has presented sufficient evidence to raise gen-
uine issues of fact that would permit a finding in his favor. The burden of
persuasion, however, is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve upon proper
instructions. The jury determines whether the party assigned the burden has
persuaded it of the existence of the fact in issue.
There is no jury in cases arising under Title VII.20 The trial court, there-
fore, must decide as a matter of law whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to convince, and whether, as a matter of fact, it is convinced that a particular
state of affairs exists. Since the trial judge is performing legal and factual
duties, the line between the two burdens often has been blurred. The distinc-
tion, however, must be recognized so that the court can properly make findings
and allocate burdens.
III. IssuEs AND BURDENS IN THE McDonnell Douglas MODEL
There are two separate uses of the term "burden" and two distinct factual
issues to which those burdens must be addressed. As a result, there are bur-
dens of production and persuasion relating to the plaintiff's assertion of illegal
employer motivation-the ultimate issue-and burdens of production and per-
suasion going to the intermediate factual issue-the existence of the defen-
dant's asserted reasons. When the term "burden" is used, it is important to
define its use and identify the particular factual issue to which the defined
burden is addressed.
McDonnell Douglas provides that when confronted with a prima facie
case, the defendant's "burden" is to "articulate a reason" for the challenged
discriminatory conduct. "Articulate" is meaningless in evidentiary terms;21 it
leaves open at least four possibilities.
19. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 783-84; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2485.
20. See. e.g., United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 625 F.2d 918, 940 (10th Cir.
1979). In suits invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which often join Title VII racial discrimination
claims, there is a right to a jury trial. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460
(1975); Page v. Schlumberger Well Servs., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,104, at 16,675 (S.D.
Tex. June 13, 1980). There is a right to a jury trial under the Age Act, which employs a disparate
treatment approach similar to McDonnell Douglas. In each of these situations, not only is it par-
ticularly important to identify the respective burdens of production and persuasion, but a problem
is presented as to how much the jury should be told about the evidentiary weight of presumptions.
See also note 14 supra (jury's role in age discrimination suits).
21. Mendez, supra note 10, at 1134 n.30, 1139.
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The first and most relaxed definition of the defendant's burden to articu-
late a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason would be an obligation merely "to
state" or "to set forth." "Articulate" suggests "statement." Dictionaries define
"articulate" as "to utter distinctly."22 This definition of the "burden" to artic-
ulate would seem to invoke only a pleading obligation, with no duty to support
with evidence the factual existence of the reason pleaded.
A second, more stringent standard would be to plead and provide eviden-
tiary support sufficient to permit a fact finder to conclude that the articulated
reason exists. This burden would require more than simply "uttering dis-
tinctly" in a responsive pleading, more than inserting the reason in an argu-
ment of counsel, and more than a scintilla of supporting evidence. It would
require the introduction of credible, objective evidence that would support a
finding that the articulated reason actually existed. This approach could be
classified as a burden of presentation on the factual existence of the articu-
lated reason.
A third approach would impose on the defendant a burden not only of
presenting evidence of sufficient probative strength to allow the fact finder to
conclude that the articulated reason existed, but, in addition, to carry the bur-
den of actually persuading the fact finder of the existence of the asserted rea-
son. The burden to articulate thus would be a burden of persuasion on the
existence of the reason.
The fourth and final interpretation would be a burden on defendant to
persuade the fact finder that the articulated reason not only existed, but also
that the reason caused or motivated the particular employment action. This
would be a burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of the employer's
motivation.
IV. THE EXTREMES RESOLVED
A. The Burden of Persuasion on the Ultimate Issue of Motivation
The first Supreme Court case applying the McDonnell Douglas language,
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters2 3 did not resolve even the threshold am-
biguity of whether the burden that shifted to the defendant was one of persua-
sion on the issue of motivation or merely a burden of production. The Court
compounded the confusion by giving conflicting signals within the same para-
graph. First, the Court said: "It is apparent that the burden which shifts to the
employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration, not an illegitimate one such as race."2 ' This strongly
suggests that a burden has shifted to the defendant of proving that the reason
motivated the employment decision. A few lines later, however, the Court
22. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 64 (1976); see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 124 (unabr. 1966).
23. 438/U.S. 567 (1978).
24. Id. at 577.
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stated: "To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under
McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate some legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' "25 If the burden amounts
only to the articulation of valid reasons, it is at most one of presenting evi-
dence and perhaps no more than asserting reasons in a responsive pleading.
A few months later, in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney,26 the Court finally determined which party carried the risk of non-
persuasion on the issue of the defendant's motivation. The court of appeals
had employed conflicting language, similar to that used in Furnco. At one
point, it had indicated that the defendant must "prove the absence of discrimi-
natory motive." 27 The Supreme Court focused on this phrase and stated that
the obligation on the defendant was merely to articulate some legitimate non-
discriminatory reason. The burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of moti-
vation remains with the plaintiff. Thus, the lower court's apparent shifting of
the burden to the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive was
erroneous.
2S
Although the Court- established that the defendant's burden was in the
nature of presentation, the precise meaning of this burden was not discussed.
Three possible interpretations remained: pleading the reason, producing le-
gally sufficient evidence to support the reason's existence, or persuading the
court of the existence of the reason.
B. "Articulation". More than Pleading
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,2" the Fifth Cir-
cuit indicated its idea of the defendant's burden:
Defendant may refute plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection. This court requires defen-
dant to prove nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderance of the evidence.
This holding is not inconsistent with Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, which
merely stated that defendant is not required to prove absence of discrimina-
tory motive. Our holding ... simply states the obvious: "articulating" a legit-
imate reason involves more than merely stating fictitious reasons; legally suffi-
cient proof is needed before the trier of fact can find plaintiff's proof
rebutted.30
The court left little doubt but that it was imposing on the defendant a
burden of presenting evidence and a burden of persuasion. The burden of per-
suasion as to what issue, however, was not clearly stated. The court could have
25. Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
26. 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
27. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.),
rev'd per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
28. 439 U.S. at 25; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981).
29. 609 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
30. Id. at 567.
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been saying that the burden of persuasion went to the issue of the factual
existence of the reason. The other possibility is imposing a burden on the de-
fendant to prove legal motivation by persuading the trial court that the reason
caused the particular employment action.
The Supreme Court reversed."' At the outset, the Court agreed that the
"defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint
or by argument of counsel."'3 2 The defendant must "clearly set forth, through
the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection. '33
Thus, the most relaxed definition of "articulate a reason" was rejected. Defen-
dant's burden to "articulate" is more than a pleading obligation.
V. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE: BURDEN OF PRODUCTION-BUT AS TO
WHAT ISSUE?
Although the Burdine Court established that the defendant's burden was
a burden of producing evidence, there are two issues to which such a burden of
production could be addressed: the ultimate issue of defendant's motivation,
or the intermediate issue of the existence of the reason. If the defendant's
burden of production goes to the ultimate issue of motivation, the defendant
would have to establish the factual existence of the reason articulated. If the
defendant's burden of production goes merely to the intermediate issue of the
reason's existence, however, this burden would be satisfied by introducing evi-
dence sufficient to allow a finding that the reason exists. On the intermediate
issue of the reason's existence, is the defendant's burden one of producing evi-
dence or one of persuasion? Burdine stated:
The burden that shifts to the defendant ... is to rebut the presumption
of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or
someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The
defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against plaintiff. To accomplish
this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissi-
ble evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided
must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant ...
We stated in Sweeney that "the employer's burden is satisfied if he sim-
ply 'explains what he has done' or produces evidence of legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons." It is plain that the Court of Appeals required much
more: it placed on defendant the burden of persuading the court that it had
convincing objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant over plain-
tiff. . . . We have stated consistently that the employee's prima facie case of
discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for
31. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
32. Id. at 255 n.9.
33. Id. at 255; see Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1982)
(general allegation that person selected is better qualified is inadequate as a matter of law).
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the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only
produce admissible evidence which will allow the trier of fact factually to
conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discrimina-
tory animus. The Court of Appeals would require the defendant to introduce
evidence, which in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the
trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This exceeds what prop-
erly can be demanded to satisfy a burden of production."M
This reasoning does not resolve the issue. Some of the Court's language,
perhaps even its predominant theme, indicates that it believed that the court
of appeals improperly imposed on the defendant a burden to prove the "law-
fulness" of its action. If the Court was saying that it is erroroneous to indi-
rectly impose a burden of persuasion on the issue of motivation by requiring
the defendant to prove that the reason caused the action, then the Court was
doing no more than refining and applying the Sweeney doctrine. The Court did
state that defendant's evidence must create "a genuine issue of fact" that the
decision was not motivated by illegal animus. Creating an issue of fact on the
ultimate issue of motivation would seem to require more than a presentation of
some evidence on the intermediate issue of whether the reason exists; it would
require the defendant to establish the existence of that reason. Nonetheless,
much of the Court's language suggests that the defendant would carry its bur-
den simply by producing evidence that the articulated reason exists.
"[D]efendant must clearly set forth, through introduction of admissible evi-
dence the reasons for plaintiff's rejection. . . . '[T]he employer's burden is
satisfied if he simply explains what he has done or produces evidence of legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reasons.' "135
Given this extreme ambiguity, the Court apparently failed to appreciate
either the existence or the significance of these interpretive problems. It cer-
tainly failed to address them. Presumably, therefore, they have not been re-
solved.36 The lower courts are in disarray. Some decisions give conflicting indi-
34. 450 U.S. at 254, 256-57.
35. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 26 n.2).
36. In United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983), the Court briefly
addressed a reversal of a trial court finding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case.
The Court did not clarify the Burdine opinion; it simply restated: "To rebut this presumption, 'the
defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for
the plaintiff's rejection. . . .' In other words, the defendant must 'produc[e] evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.'"
Id. at 1481 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 255). Justices Blackmun and Brennan concurred,
stating: "While the Court is correct that the ultimate determination of factual liability in discrimi-
nation cases should be no different from that in other types of civil suits .... the McDonnell
Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he
demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not
the true reason for the employment decision." Id. at 1483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court
remanded the case to the trial court for an evaluation of the factual issue that the Court thought
had been properly framed by defendant's articulation of a reason for the treatment of the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's presentation of evidence suggesting improper racial motivation. Although the
majority opinion perhaps implied that the defendant need do nothing more than present evidence
that would support a finding that the reason exists, Justice Blackmun implied that the burden
might be one of establishing to the court's satisfaction the existence of the reasons.
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cations of the defendant's burden.37 Some courts have held that the
defendant's burden is only one of producing evidence that supports the exis-
tence of the reason. Any burden of persuading the fact finder that the reason
does not exist is part of the plaintiff's burden of proving pretext.38 Others ap-
pear to hold that the defendant's burden is one of persuasion on the existence
of the reason, and if the defendant fails to prove the existence of a reason, the
37. On remand, the Fifth Circuit stated: "In responding to a plaintiff's proof of a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, the defendant employer need only produce admissible
evidence that would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision
had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs, 647 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1981). This language would not preclude imposing on the
defendant a burden of convincing the fact finder of the existence of the articulated reason. As will
be developed in the text, only if the reason is proved to exist could the "trier of fact rationally
conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by a discriminatory animus ...
[D]efendant's burden in this respect is one of production only, not one of persuasion." Id. This
statement suffers from the ambiguity of Burdine in that it does not define as to what issue the
burden of production is addressed. In Brooks v. Ashtubula County Welfare Dept., 717 F.2d 263
(6th Cir. 1983), the trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that the reason
articulated did not exist. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court had imposed on
the defendant the burden of proving that the reason motivated the decision. Id. at 267. The court
of appeals thus confused the burden of persuasion on the issue of motivation with the burden of
establishing the existence of the reason relied upon. For other examples of this confusion and
uncertainty, see Verniero v. Air Force Academy School Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 393 (10th
Cir. 1983) (McKay, J., dissenting); Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th
Cir. 1983); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Ind. School Dist. No. 662, 663 F.2d 65,
67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). A pre-Burdine trial court decision held that the defendant's burden
was to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and ruled in favor of the plaintiff because
the defendant failed to convince the court of the reason's existence. A panel of the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Ind. School Dist. No. 662, 25 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 296 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 1981). The court en banc set aside the panel affirmance
and reversed the trial court ruling, stating: "[Defendant] need not prove that such a reason existed
in the sense of persuading the trier of fact." 663 F.2d at 66. This is clear enough, but the court
added: "The burden of persuasion remains at all times on the plaintiff." Id. This indicates that the
court confused the burden of proving the existence of the reason with the ultimate risk of non-
persuasion on the issue of employer motivation. These are two distinct issues. In St. Peters v.
Secretary of the Army, 659 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the defendant's articulated reason for not
promoting the plaintiff was her inferior qualifications. The trial court found, however, that al-
though the plaintiff had the superior qualifications, she had failed to carry the risk of non-persua-
sion on the issue of the illegality of the employer's motivation. The court granted judgment for the
defendant. The court of appeals affirmed and indicated that the defendant met its burden of artic-
ulating a reason merely by presenting evidence of the "reason" (person selected was superior), and
thus shifted the burden back to the plaintiff to prove discriminatory motive. Given the result, the
defendant had no duty to convince the trial court of the existence of the "reason" (superior quali-
fications of the person selected). Id. at 1140.
Sanchez v. Texas Comm'n on Alcoholism, 660 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1981), addressed an argu-
ment by the plaintiff that the person selected lacked the qualification (college degree) that was
articulated as the reason for rejecting the plaintiff. The court stated:
This argument misconceives the burden of proof in a Title VII action. . . . [Defen-
dant] does not bear the burden of proving that the . . . [person selected] in fact at-
tended an accredited college. Rather, the. . . [defendant] need only present "clear and
reasonably specific" reasons for its conduct. The task of demonstrating the falsity of
these reasons forms part of the plaintiff's burden to show that the employer's reasons
are pretextual.
Id. at 662. For pre-Burdine cases to the same effect, see Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150,
1155 (2d Cir. 1978); Barnes v. Saint Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977).
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plaintiff is entitled to judgment.39
The ambiguity needs to be resolved. The proper resolution is that the de-
fendant's burden is to produce evidence on the ultimate issue of motivation. To
produce such evidence, the defendant must establish the factual existence of
the reason allegedly relied upon.40
39. Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Peters v. Lieuallen,
693 F.2d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller v. WFLI Radio, 687 F.2d 137, 138 (6th Cir. 1982);
Schulz v. Veterans' Admin., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 209, 211 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1982).
Some courts have indicated that when the trial court finds that the reason articulated by defen-
dant does not actually exist, pretextual motivation has been established as a matter of law. See
Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir. 1983); Mohammed v. Calaway, 698
F.2d 395, 399 (10th Cir. 1983); Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982);
Adams v. Gaudet, 515 F. Supp. 1086, 1097 (N.D. Miss. 1981). Such a holding is the functional
equivalent of finding that the defendant must establish the existence of the reason. Some pre-
Burdine cases strongly suggested that the defendant's burden is to establish the existence of the
reason articulated. See Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ostapowicz
v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976).
40. This issue is related to, but different from, "dual motivation." Dual motivation involves
a situation where a plaintiff has succeeded in establishing as a matter of fact that illegal animus
played some role in the decision. The defendant asserts that notwithstanding the illegal motive, its
action was ultimately caused by legal considerations. In NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983), the Court addressed the issue of dual motivation in the context of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The National
Labor Relations Board had found that illegal anti-union animus contributed to an employee's
discharge. The Board held that the employer could avoid liability only by proving that notwith-
standing the animus the employee would have been fired for permissible reasons. Although the
employer had apparently asserted and proved some valid reasons, the Board was not convinced
that the employee would have been fired had it not been for the illegal animus. The employer
responded that this approach improperly shifted the burden of proving an unfair labor practice
from the Board to the charged party. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, correctly recog-
nizing that the Board's General Counsel retained the burden of proving that the illegal motive had
contributed to the employer's action. Thus, the burden of persuasion had not been shifted to the
employer. The employer's claim that it would have made the same decision even absent the ani-
mus, however, is like an affirmative defense, and the employer bears the burden on the issue.
Similar results have been reached under Title VII. Once a plaintiff has carried the burden
imposed by Sweeney and Burdine of proving that an illegal motive played a role in causing the
decision, the employer can escape liability only by convincing the fact finder that the same deci-
sion would have been made absent the illegal motivation. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552,
1557 (11th Cir. 1983); Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (unconstitutional motive).
In dual motivation cases, it is accepted that the employer possessed illegal animus and that a
legitimate reasons existed for discharging the plaintiff. The problem is proving which motive con-
trolled the decision. This Article addresses a different issue: whether the plaintiff can establish
that the illegal motive played any role in the action. Consequently, the problem is determining
where to place the burden of persuading the fact finder that the reason asserted by the employer
actually exists. Nevertheless, the dual motive problem is instructive. It teaches that so long as the
plaintiff is required to prove the existence of illegal motivation, it is proper to place on the em-
ployer the burden of persuasion on other issues relevant to the ultimate issue. It is also permissible
to shift to the employer the burdens related to the role of its articulated reasons, even though the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of motivation.
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VI. BEYOND Burdine: A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS
A. Step One: Defining the Term "Reason"
The underlying confrontation in Burdine between the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court finds its source in two different, but unacknowledged,
definitions given to the term "reason." When the court of appeals required the
defendant to prove the existence of the reason for its employment action, it
appeared to assume that the word "reason" embraced solely objective facts:
that a reason was a demonstrably existing state of affairs, and that the defen-
dant's burden was to establish the existence of those objective facts. The Su-
preme Court, however, appeared to conclude that the word "reason" necessa-
rily contained a subjective motivational element. Given this conception, when
the court of appeals required the defendant to establish the reason, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the defendant was being required to prove an
existing state of facts and that those existing facts caused the defendant to
act. It thus appeared to the Court that when the defendant had to prove a
reason, it was being forced indirectly to carry a burden of persuasion of the
ultimate issue of the defendant's motivation, an obligation rejected in
Sweeney.4"
The interpretive problem can be resolved by refining the term "reason."
The word "reason" can be divided into two elements, objective and subjective.
By requiring the defendant to articulate a reason, McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine made it clear that more was required than a subjective denial of ille-
gal motivation. "Reason" necessarily presupposed the existence of underlying
objective facts. Motivation must spring from facts. There must exist objective
facts upon which the subjective motivation is premised. Drinking on the job,
theft of company property, cursing a supervisor, fighting, tardiness, absentee-
ism, violation of a safety rule, and lack of work are all factually based and
objectively verifiable events that exist or take place wholly apart from any
issue of the subjective motivation of subsequent employer actions. These events
or facts either occurred or they did not. Thus, it would be appropriate to de-
fine these facts as reasons and divorce them entirely from any issue of whether
the facts or events caused a particular response. This is what the court of
appeals in Burdine appeared to be doing.
After the underlying fact is established, the term "reason" can, but need
not, imply an element of subjective motivation: whether the existing state of
facts "caused" the particular response by the actor. This two-level definition of
"reason" serves as a counter-proposition to the plaintiff's burden of proving
discriminatory motive. If an employer action was "caused" by given employee
conduct, then the action was not motivated by illegal reasons. Therefore,
41. 439 U.S. at 25. The Eighth Circuit has suffered from the same difficulty, assuming
that a burden of proving the "reason" necessarily imposed on defendant a burden of proving
proper motivation. See Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Ind. School Dist., 663 F.2d
65, 67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (discussed at note 35 supra).
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should a party be assigned a burden of proving that the misconduct was the
"causal reason" for the discharge, that party would be assigned a burden of
proving legal motivation. This "causal reason" idea may have been the unspo-
ken interpretation of "reason" employed by the Supreme Court in Burdine. If
so, its conclusion was manifestly correct; indeed, it was mandated by Sweeney.
The term "reason" need not, and in a Title VII context should not, be
assigned a two-level meaning that includes a subjective, causational element.
The concept of "reason," as used by McDonnell Douglas, should be limited to
its purely objective base. Proving a "reason" means establishing the existence
of the state of facts or events upon which the defendant's action allegedly was
based. Thus, if an employee was allegedly discharged for cursing a supervisor,
drinking, or fighting, the employer's burden of "articulating" a "reason"
would include only convincing the fact finder that the cursing, fighting, or
drinking actually took place or was believed by the employer to have taken
place. Whether the reason motivated the discharge is a separate issue that is
not necessarily resolved by determining that an objective reason existed.
B. Step Two: Combining the Elements
Framing a proper analysis of the defendant's burden requires bringing
together three concepts. "Reason" must be defined in objective terms, the bur-
dens of production and persuasion must be employed in their proper contexts,
and the two levels of factual inquiry (ultimate and intermediate) must be rec-
ognized. It is important to recall the distinction between the burden of persua-
sion on the ultimate issue of motivation, which undoubtedly remains with the
plaintiff, and the burdens relating to the intermediate issue of whether the
proffered reason factually exists. When "reason" is defined in objective terms,
a burden of persuading the fact finder that the articulated reason, objectively
defined, actually exists does not impose on the defendant the burden of persua-
sion on the distinct issue of the employer's motivation.42 Defendant can be
subjected to the burden of persuading the fact finder that an intermediate fact
(reason) exists, which fact (reason) evidences the ultimate fact in issue (moti-
vation), without obligating the defendant to persuade the fact finder of the
existence of the ultimate fact (motivation).
It is possible with these premises to evaluate properly the nature of the
defendant's "burden" to "articulate a reason." The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of
illegally motivated discrimination.43 According to the Thayer view of presump-
42. The two burdens can exist simultaneously. J. TRACY, supra note 18, at 23; 9 J. WiG-
MORE, supra note 10, § 2489.
43. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481 (1983). In Furnco, the
Court talked in terms of the plaintiff creating an "inference" of illegal motivation:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination
only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the condition of impermissible factors .... And we are willing to presume
this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do
[Vol. 49
HeinOnline  -- 49 Mo. L. Rev. 32 1984
1984] TITLE VII BURDENS 33
tions,44 adopted by the Court in Burdine 5 and embodied in Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the defendant's burden of addressing a presump-
tion is to meet or rebut the presumed fact with evidence tending to establish
the nonexistence of that presumed fact.46 Furnco teaches that the fact pre-
sumed from plaintiff's McDonnell Douglas showing is illegal motivation. To
meet or rebut the presumed fact of illegal motivation, the defendant must
create a counter-inference of proper motivation. Subjective motivation is
proved by inferences, and inferences can flow only from established facts.'4
Thus, to draw an inference of proper motivation, the court would have to find
that basic facts upon which that inference depend actually exist.
If the reason articulated by the defendant is found to exist, that fact is
significant, not because it conclusively establishes the legality of defendant's
action, but because the court can infer from the factual existence of the ar-
ticulated reason that the reason motivated the employment decision. 48 In such
a case, the initially presumed fact of illegal motivation has been addressed and
placed in issue by an inference of legal motivation properly drawn from the
existence of basic facts.
If the asserted reason is found not to exist, however, there is no factual
basis for inferring that the defendant's action was motivated by the reason.
not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in the
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant are elimi-
nated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the em-
ployer, whom we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race.
438 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted). In Burdine, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's prima
facie case created a "rebuttable presumption" of illegal motivation, which, unless challenged,
would entitle the plaintiff to judgment. 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
44. J. THAYER, supra note 12, at 346. According to this theory, a presumption merely
shifts a burden of production with regard to the fact presumed. It does not shift any burden of
persuasion as to the existence of that fact. Once the party against whom the presumption operates
has carried that burden of production, the presumption loses all evidentiary value as to the ulti-
mate factual issue; it "is spent and disappears." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 821; see 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2487(d).
45. 450 U.S. at 255 nn.8-10.
46. "[I]f proof of fact B is introduced and a presumption exists to the effect that fact A
can be inferred from fact B, the party denying the existence of fact A must then introduce proof
of its nonexistence or risk having a verdict directed against him." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18,
at 803; see also S. REPT. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (in the context of the federal
rules of evidence, "while evidence of facts giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of coming
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, it does not shift the burden of persuasion
on the existence of the presumed facts"), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051,
7056; Mendez, supra note 10, at 1147-48.
47. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 803; J. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 453 (1935).
48. According to the strict Thayer view, once the presumption is challenged by contradic-
tory evidence going to the fact presumed, the presumption disappears and leaves no evidentiary
impact on the ultimate issue. The Burdine Court gave a qualified acceptance to that approach.
Once the defendant properly challenges the inference of illegal motivation, the plaintiff will have
to produce some evidence beyond the prima facie case that indicates the defendant's illegal mo-
tive. Nevertheless, the "evidence and inferences properly drawn . . .[from the prima facie show-
ing] may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual." 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
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Only if the reason is found to exist can a court infer that the reason motivated
the action. Thus, the existence of the reason is the antecedent fact necessary
for the creation of the inference going to the presumed fact of illegal motiva-
tion. If the defendant does not establish this fact (the reason) from which
proper motivation can be inferred, it has failed in its burden to meet and re-
fute the presumed fact of illegal motivation. Plaintiff would be entitled to a
judgment in such cases.
As a general rule of evidence, the party seeking to create an inference has
the burden of proving the existence of the facts necessary to draw the infer-
ence. 49 Furthermore, "[fin most cases, the party who has the burden of plead-
ing a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading the
jury of its existence as well."'50 McDonnell Douglas placed the burden of "ar-
ticulating" a "reason" on the defendant, and Furnco indicated that defen-
dant's burden was to create an inference of legal motivation. Established rules
of evidence, therefore, would require that the defendant's "burden to articu-
late reasons" must go beyond merely presenting credible evidence that the rea-
son exists. The defendant, as the party seeking to create the inference of legal
motivation and who has the burden of pleading the reason, bears the burden of
persuasion on the issue of the existence of the articulated reason.
The defendant's burden is one of going forward on the ultimate issue of
motivation. To carry this burden of going forward on motivation, the defen-
dant must carry a burden of persuasion on the issue of the fact necessary to
create an inference of legal motivation. This means convincing the fact finder
that the "reason" exists.
Assume that a black employee who was discharged establishes the ele-
ments of a prima facie case. The employer asserts that the plaintiff was dis-
charged for insubordination (cursing a supervisor), a fact that the plaintiff
denies. At this stage there are two distinct factual issues. The ultimate, under-
lying issue is the employer's motivation. The intermediate issue is whether the
employee cursed his supervisor. If the employee cursed his supervisor, the exis-
tence of that fact would permit an inference that it was the employee's curs-
ing, rather than his race, that motivated the employer action. Conversely, if
the employee did not curse the supervisor, it is not possible to infer that it was
the cursing, rather than race, which motivated the discharge.
Continuing the example, assume that the employer offers as evidentiary
support for its allegation of insubordination the sworn testimony of the super-
visor involved, who states that he ordered the plaintiff to perform certain tasks,
that the plaintiff refused to do as directed and responded with a series of epi-
thets. The employer's reason thus was clear and reasonably specific, and it was
supported by admission of evidence that would allow a trier of fact to ration-
ally conclude that the plaintiff had engaged in acts warranting discharge. It
may be concluded that the defendant, having met an initial production burden,
49. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 821; J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, at 453.
50. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 785; see 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2486.
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would be entitled to judgment unless the plaintiff can present evidence indicat-
ing that the articulated reason did not exist. This conclusion is correct. Once
the defendant has carried the initial burden of production on the issue of the
reason's existence, the plaintiff appropriately could be assigned the burden to
put in issue that presentation. That is, the burden of production on the issue of
the existence of the reason now shifts to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff presents
nothing contesting the factual existence of the articulated reason, the court
must assume, from the defendant's uncontested legally sufficient evidentiary
showing, that the fact of insubordination exists. In turn, the existence of the
fact of insubordination requires the court to infer that the insubordination mo-
tivated the discharge.
There can be no doubt that after the defendant presents evidence of the
reason's existence, Burdine assigns to the plaintiff a burden of producing evi-
dence that challenges the defendant's showing.51 Just because the burden of
presenting evidence on the existence of the "reason" has shifted to the plaintiff
after defendant articulates reasons, however, does not mean that the risk of
persuasion on that issue also must shift. The risk of persuasion on the issue of
the reason's existence should stay with the defendant.52
Returning to the hypothetical, assume that the plaintiff testifies (in rebut-
tal, or during the initial presentation) that the supervisor came to him, accused
him of malingering, and uttered a series of racial insults. The plaintiff denies
that he was directed to do any particular job and denies that he cursed the
supervisor. With this testimony, the plaintiff has responded to the defendant's
51. There are two approaches a trial court could take in viewing the defendant's evidence
that a "reason" existed. The first is that such evidence creates a "permissible inference" that the
reason existed, an inference that prohibits the court from ruling as a matter of law in favor of the
plaintiff, but which the court is not compelled to find. The court could simply disbelieve the defen-
dant's evidence and conclude that even though the evidence was legally sufficient, it did not per-
suade the court that the fact existed. A second approach would be that the defendant's presenta-
tion going to a fact in issue creates a "presumption" that requires a finding on the disputed fact in
the defendant's favor, unless that fact is placed in issue by the plaintiff's producing legally suffi-
cient evidence indicating its nonexistence. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2493. The Burdine
Court adopted the approach that once legally sufficient evidence was presented by defendant on
the fact in issue, a trial court would be required to find that the fact existed unless countered and
placed in issue by legally sufficient evidence. 450 U.S. at 254-56.
52. The courts have utilized the approach of shifting intermediate burdens in adverse im-
pact cases. When the plaintiff establishes adverse impact, the burden is upon the defendant to
establish the "business necessity" of the criteria proved to have had the impact. See Dothard v.
Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975). The concept of necessity includes "lesser discriminatory alternatives"; a practice is not
"necessary" if there are alternative devices that have less of a discriminatory impact. It is gener-
ally agreed that the burden of establishing the existence of a "lesser discriminatory alternative" is
not upon the defendant, but is a burden shifted to plaintiff once the "work relatedness" of the rule
had been proved by the defendant. Id. If the plaintiff establishes the existence of lesser discrimina-
tory alternatives, however, she is entitled to a judgment without having to prove, as a matter of
fact, that the rule was improperly motivated. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191-92 (4th
Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982). If the plain-
tiff cannot establish the existence of a lesser discriminatory alternative, she is still free to show
that the reason was pretextual. "Necessity" and "pretext" are separate issues. Cf. New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (failed to recognize this duality).
1984]
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production and satisfied any duty to produce contradictory evidence. The issue
of the fact of the reason (insubordination) is joined. The trial judge now is
faced with a classic example of a factual issue based upon credibility.
Given the above evidence, there are three conclusions that the court could
reach: (1) "I don't believe the employee's version," (2) "I don't believe the
supervisor's version," or (3) "I'm undecided; I don't know for sure which to
believe." Analysis of the first is easy. If the judge accepts the employer's ver-
sion of the incident, then the conclusion is appropriately reached that the dis-
charge was motivated by the insubordination of the employee. Having found
that the employee cursed the supervisor and refused to follow instructions, the
inference will be drawn that the insubordination caused the employer reaction,
thus meeting and countering the presumption created by the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Absent evidence that the reason was used as a pretext, the defen-
dant is entitled to judgment.
If the judge concludes that the plaintiff's version of the insubordination
incident is the more credible ("I do not think plaintiff cursed the supervisor",),
the judge cannot draw any inference that insubordination was the motive for
the discharge. Even though the defendant has presented evidence on the issue
of insubordination that would permit a finding for defendant on that issue, a
faithful application of McDonnell Douglas and Furnco would indicate that the
plaintiff's prima facie showing of improper motivation is yet to be placed in
issue. The defendant has carried an initial burden of production on the inter-
mediate issue of the reason's existence. Since, in light of the plaintiff's contra-
dictory evidence, the trial court did not accept defendant's evidence as true,
the defendant has failed to carry a burden of placing in issue the ultimate fact
of motivation. It cannot be inferred that the defendant was motivated by the
plaintiff's insubordination if it is found that the plaintiff was not insubordinate.
The plaintiff should be entitled to a judgment.
If Burdine held that the defendant meets the totality of its burdens solely
by presenting evidentiary support for its articulated "reason," with such pres-
entation shifting back to the plaintiff the risk of convincing the fact finder of
illegal motivation, totally illogical results are possible. Although the trial judge
concluded that the act of insubordination did not take place, and no other
reason was offered, the judge still might not be convinced that it was the plain-
tiff's race that motivated the discharge, and thus he would rule in favor of
defendant. In short, it would be permissible for a trial judge to conclude the
following: "Notwithstanding my belief that plaintiff did not curse the supervi-
sor, the plaintiff has failed to convince me that he was discharged because of
his race. Thus, judgment for the defendant."53
That such a result could occur demonstrates the lack of logic and the
patent error of such an approach. The plaintiff has been deprived of the bene-
53. The result is not hypothetical. That is exactly what the trial court did in St. Peters v.
Secretary of the Army, 659 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1016 (1982). Sanchez v,
Texas Comm'n on Alcoholism, 660 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1981), suggests a similar result.
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fit of the presumption of racial discrimination drawn from his factually based
prima facie case, without any factual support for the contradicting inference.
Although the court has concluded that no legitimate reason has been estab-
lished for discharging the employee, the employee was still denied a judgment.
This is contrary to Furnco, which teaches that when no legitimate reason ex-
ists for rejecting an employee, the court must assume that it was more likely
than not that the employer based his decision on an impermissible reason.
The third possible finding by the trial judge on the contested issue of
insubordination could be: "I'm undecided. I don't know who is telling the
truth. It is a 50-50 proposition." If the trial judge is unsure whether the facts
upon which that inference depends actually exist, it would be impossible for
the court to draw an inference of proper motivation. The burden on the defen-
dant is to establish facts from which a court can infer legal motivation. For a
court to infer that insubordination, rather than race, motivated the discharge,
the judge must first conclude that the fact of insubordination took place.
If the defendant may carry its burden of "articulating a reason" solely by
presenting evidence on the issue of insubordination, the actual result in most
cases is quite predictable. The court will almost be forced to rule in favor of
defendant, reasoning as follows: "Since the defendant has met its 'burden of
articulating a reason' by presenting creditable evidence of insubordination, the
burden is on the plaintiff to convince me that the discharge was because of his
race. Since I am undecided on whether plaintiff did or did not curse his super-
visor, I must conclude that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of persuad-
ing me that it was his race that motivated his discharge."
The practical effect, therefore, of imposing on the defendant only a bur-
den of producing evidence on the secondary issue of the existence of the rea-
son, would be to force the plaintiff to disprove the existence of the articulated
reason. Only by successfully disproving the existence of the articulated reason
would the plaintiff have any hope of actually convincing the trial judge that it
was race that motivated the discharge. A plaintiff who has a burden of proving
a negative has an almost impossible burden, which, because of the difficulty, is
rarely assigned."
54. See J. TRACY, supra note 18, at 24-25; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2486. Burdine
arguably imposed such a burden on the plaintiff:
[Plaintiff] must now have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the employment decision. . . . She may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employers proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence.
450 U.S. at 256. By requiring the plaintiff to prove that the proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence, the Court may be placing the burden on the plaintiff to disprove the existence of the
articulated reason. Later in the opinion, the Court observed:
[D]efendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably spe-
cific. . . . [A]lthough defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the de-
fendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employ-
ment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to prove the
factual basis for its explanation.
Id. at 258. These statements are extremely ambiguous. Although claiming that the defendant has
1984]
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Furthermore, because of the extremely awkward position in which an em-
ployee finds herself in attempting to prove a negative proposition, the estab-
lished "law" of industrial relations requires the employer to establish to the
satisfaction of the fact finder the existence of the grounds for the discipline.55
Experience has proved that is the best place for that burden. Given the signifi-
cance of Title VII rights, a court should do no less.56
Finally, unlike the elements of a prima facie case, which the plaintiff
must prove to exist, most "reasons" depend upon facts solely within the control
of the defendant. It is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who knows what caused
its particular actions. If it is a reason other than the most common causes for
employment rejection already established by the prima facie case, the em-
ployer, who has the easiest access to the evidence, should be required to estab-
lish the existence thereof. The law of evidence traditionally places the burden
of both production and proof upon the party with this access.5 7 There is no
reason that the courts should not follow that general rule in Title VII
litigation.58
no formal burden of persuasion (as to which issue the Court did not say), the Court alluded to the
defendant's "incentive" to prove a legal motivation. This incentive would "normally" result in
defendant "attempting" to prove a "factual basis." This says nothing about a defendant that fails
in its attempt.
55. Gorske, Burden of Proof in Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ. L. Rav. 135, 147-49
(1959) ("Arbitrators have almost invariably held that the burden of proving 'just cause' is on the
employer."). Various rationales have been utilized by arbitrators to place this burden on employ-
ers: (1) discharge is the most severe penalty an employer can impose, thus the employer must
establish the legitimacy of its action; (2) as the reasons for the action are peculiarly within the
employer's knowledge, he should be required to establish them because otherwise the employee
would be obligated to prove a "universal negative;" (3) persons should not be considered "wrong-
doers" until proved to be; (4) sound industrial management should require an employer to have
reasonable objective grounds for serious actions and should impose a duty to retrace the discipli-
nary process; (5) the employer's "cause" is in the nature of an "affirmative defense" to illegal
action, and thus should be proved by the party asserting it.
56. In adverse impact cases, the burden imposed on the defendant by Griggs is to establish
the "business necessity" of a practice having an adverse impact on a protected class. At the very
least, this requires proof that the rule is manifestly related to bona fide employment purposes. The
burden on the defendant then is to do more than simply produce evidence that would allow the
fact finder to conclude that there was a business purpose being served by the discriminatory rule.
Rather, the defendant must prove to the satisfaction of the court that such a purpose in fact exists
and that there exists a "manifest relationship" between that purpose and the rule. Dothard v.
Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); see Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.17
(1983).
Under the Equal Pay Act, the burden on the defendant, after the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of sex-based pay discrimination, is to establish that any distinction was based on
a "factor other than sex." See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1)(iv) (1976). The defendant's burden on the
issue is one of persuasion: to convince the fact finder that the articulated factor was the cause of
the pay differential. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
In disparate treatment cases, placing a similar burden on the defendant to establish the exis-
tence of the justification offered would provide a modicum of consistency. If the defendant's bur-
den is merely to present evidence as to the existence of the asserted justification, however, incon-
sistency and potential for confusion would be injected into Title VII litigation.
57. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2486; J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, at 444.
58. A number of courts have adopted this analysis. See note 39 supra. In Eastland v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 625-26 (l1th Cir. 1983), the court found that the reason
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VII. SUMMARY: A SUGGESTION FOR TRIAL FINDINGS IN DISPARATE'
TREATMENT CASES
The burden on the defendant is not a burden of persuasion on the ulti-
mate issue of motivation. Sweeney, Burdine, and Aikens make that clear. The
burden of persuasion on the issue of defendant's motivation stays with the
plaintiff. On the other hand, when faced with a prima facie showing of ille-
gally motivated action, the defendant has an obligation to come forward with
legally sufficient evidence of a legitimate reason; this obligation is not satisfied
by denying illegal motivation or pleading a reason in the answer. Burdine and
Aikens did not make clear to what issue the defendant's burden of presenta-
tion is addressed. A proper analysis must recognize that in addressing the ulti-
mate issue of motivation, a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption
of illegal motivation, and the defendant's burden must be to challenge that
presumption. Therefore, the defendant's burden is a burden of production on
the issue of motivation. In addressing that issue of motivation, the defendant
must establish facts from which proper motivation can be inferred. This, in
turn, means that the defendant must carry a burden of persuasion on the issue
of the existence of facts from which proper motivation can be inferred. There-
fore, as to the issue of the existence of objectively defined "reasons," the de-
fendant's burden is one of persuasion.
The first duty of the trial court in a disparate treatment case is to resolve
whether the plaintiff has established the McDonnell Douglas elements re-
quired for a prima facie showing of discriminatory motive. If the plaintiff has
not carried the burden of persuading the trial court that the six elements nec-
essary for a prima facie case exist, the court must grant a judgment in favor of
the defendant. If the prima facie case is found to exist, the defendant will have
to make an evidentiary presentation that would allow the trial court to con-
clude that an objectively defined, legitimate reason existed for the action. If
that showing is unchallenged, and there is no evidence of pretext, the defen-
dant would be entitled to a judgment. If the factual existence of the reason is
challenged by contradictory evidence, however, the defendant must carry the
burden of persuading the court that the articulated reason did exist. If the
trial court is not convinced that the reason exists, judgment must be given in
favor of the plaintiff. If the court is convinced that the reason does exist and is
legitimate, then the inference of illegal motivation has been met and refuted.
The plaintiff now must present evidence going directly to the issue of motiva-
tion, and convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that it was
articulated at trial was not the reason given when the employment decision was made, and this
established pretext as a matter of law. Thus, finding the non-existence of the reason at the time of
hiring required a judgment for the plaintiff. See also NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983) (discussed at note 40 supra). If there had been no improper shift-
ing of the burden of proof by requiring the employer to persuade the fact finder that legal reasons
would have caused the decision notwithstading an illegal motivation, it would seem that without
shifting the ultimate burden of proof, an employer could be required to prove the simple existence
of the reason it was asserting as the motivating purpose.
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illegal considerations, not the articulated reason, that motivated the defen-
dant-a burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of motivation.
The trial court should thus proceed according to this sequence:
(1) Has the plaintiff established to my satisfaction the existence of the
McDonnell Douglas elements? If not, judgment for the defendant (burden of
going forward on the issue of motivation, requiring a burden of establishing
the necessary facts).
(2) If yes, has the defendant articulated a reason for its action that is
"legitimate" '59 and introduced admissible evidence of sufficient weight that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that the reason articulated exists? If not,
judgment for the plaintiff (burden of going forward on issue of reason's
existence).
(3) If yes, has the plaintiff presented legally credible evidence that the
reason articulated by the defendant does not exist? If no, judgment for the
defendant (burden of going forward shifted to plaintiff on the issue of the
reason's existence).
(4) If yes, examining all the evidence on the issue of the existence of the
reason, has the defendant convinced the court by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, on an objective level, the reason articulated exists? If not, judg-
ment for the plaintiff (burden of persuasion on the issue of the reason's
existence).
(5) If yes, has the plaintiff presented evidence beyond the prima facie
case that indicates that the defendant had a discriminatory motivation? Is
there credible evidence of "pretext"? If no, judgment for the defendant (bur-
den of going forward on the ultimate issue of motivation).
(6) If yes, examining all of the evidence, the prima facie case, the evi-
dence of pretext, against the strength of the inference drawn from the defen-
dant's articulated reasons, has the plaintiff convinced me as a fact finder that
the action taken by defendant was motivated by considerations made illegal by
Title VII? If not, judgment for defendant. If yes, judgment for plaintiff (bur-
den of persuasion on the ultimate issue of motivation).60
These six steps provide a logical guide for trial courts that is faithful to
the McDonnell Douglas-Furnco model. It would be appropriate for appellate
courts to require that trial judges make findings on each of the above eviden-
59. "Legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory" are questions to be determined by the court as
a matter of law. A reason would be legitimate and nondiscriminatory if it is lawful and sufficiently
reasonable to permit a finding of fact in favor of defendant on the issue of motivation. The defen-
dant need not establish the "necessity" of the reason, in that it is directly related to actual work
performance, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973), or that it is the
"best," "least discriminatory alternative" available. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577-78 (1978). A defendant should be required, however, to establish the rationality of the
reason. It would be impossible to infer that an irrational reason motivated the employer's treat-
ment. See note 10 supra.
60. It is still open to the defendant to show that notwithstanding the illegal motivation, it
would have made the same decision based on legal grounds. See note 40 supra.
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tiary steps. In this way, more effective judicial review would be possible."1 Cer-
tainly, it is a method much preferable to simply setting the trial court afloat
on a sea of unchanneled facts from which the court would emerge at the end
of the evidence and simply announce: "I find that the defendant did (did not)
illegally discriminate against the plaintiff."
61. The ultimate finding of motivation is one of "fact," subject to limited review. See Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928,
940 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 97 (1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The issue of the legal
sufficiency of evidence to support findings on subsidiary issues is probably one of law, subject to
more thorough judicial review. Cf Gay v. Waiters' Union, Local 30, 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982)
(de novo standard of review applied to distrct court's finding that plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination). But cf. Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, 663 F.2d 1268
(4th Cir. 1981) (court of appeals applied clearly erroneous standard to finding that plaintiff had
not sustained burden of persausion on discrimination issue), vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
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